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Aircraft Loss-of-Control Accident Analysis 
Christine M. Belcastro* and John V. Foster† 
NASA Langley Research Center, Hampton, Virginia, 23681 
Loss of control remains one of the largest contributors to fatal aircraft accidents 
worldwide.  Aircraft loss-of-control accidents are complex in that they can result from 
numerous causal and contributing factors acting alone or (more often) in combination.  
Hence, there is no single intervention strategy to prevent these accidents.  To gain a better 
understanding into aircraft loss-of-control events and possible intervention strategies, this 
paper presents a detailed analysis of loss-of-control accident data (predominantly from Part 
121), including worst case combinations of causal and contributing factors and their 
sequencing.  Future potential risks are also considered. 
Nomenclature 
CAST  = Commercial Aviation Safety Team 
ICAO  = International Civil Aviation Organization  
LOC  = Loss of Control (in-flight) 
NASA  =  National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NextGen  = Next Generation Airspace Operations Concept 
NTSB  =  National Transportation Safety Board 
PIO  =  Pilot Induced Oscillation 
 
I. Introduction 
 
oss of control remains one of the largest contributors to fatal aircraft accidents.  As shown in Figure 1, in-flight 
loss of control (LOC) is the largest fatal accident category for commercial jet airplane accidents worldwide 
occurring from 1999 through 2008, and resulted in 22 accidents and 1,991 total fatalities. 1  Aircraft loss of control is 
a significant contributor to accidents and fatalities across all vehicle classes, operational categories, and phases of 
flight.  It is also a highly complex event, usually resulting from multiple causal and contributing factors that can 
occur individually or (more often) in combination.  There is therefore no single intervention strategy that can be 
readily identified to prevent LOC accidents.  In order to develop effective intervention strategies for preventing LOC 
accidents, it is necessary to analyze how these events unfold.  In Reference [2], 74 LOC accidents were reviewed for 
the time period 1993 – 2007, which resulted in 42 hull loss accidents and 3241 fatalities. The analysis of this 
reference groups the accidents into the categories aerodynamic stall, flight control system, spatial disorientation of 
the crew, contaminated airfoil, and atmospheric disturbance.  There is also a detailed discussion of accidents in each 
of these categories and a comparison with older accidents that occurred prior to 1993 in order to identify emerging 
trends.  This reference also provides a definition of aircraft upset conditions, which is defined therein as “any 
uncommanded or inadvertent event with an abnormal aircraft attitude, rate of change of aircraft attitude, 
acceleration, airspeed, or flight trajectory”.  As also noted in Ref. [2], “abnormal” must be determined relative to 
phase of flight and aircraft type.  Reference [3] contains an analysis of LOC accidents between 1988 and 2004 
relative to operational categories, including Parts 121, 135, and 91.  This report states that “in flight loss of control is 
a serious aviation problem”, and that “well over half of the loss of control accidents included at least one fatality 
(80% in Part 121), and roughly half of all aviation fatalities in the studied time period occurred in conjunction with 
loss of control”.  The study of Ref. [3] also found that about 30% of Part 121 loss of control accidents involved 
system/component failure/malfunction, and that icing and adverse winds were also the primary cause of many 
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accidents.  In 2009, NASA commissioned an independent study of aircraft loss of control. 4  The final report from 
this study organized causal and contributing factors into human-induced, environmentally-induced, and systems-
induced categories and concluded that “no single category is solely responsible for loss of control accidents” and 
that “accidents occur when combinations of breakdowns happen across human and engineering systems, and often 
in the presence of threats posed by the external environment”.  This report further states that “a sympathetic read of 
the loss of control accidents should leave one with little hope of reducing them if efforts toward improvement were 
aimed in a single direction or within a single category”.     
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Aircraft Accident Statistics for Worldwide Commercial Jet Fleet, 1999 – 2008.  
 
 
In this paper, the analysis seeks to identify worst case combinations and sequencing of precursors to aircraft 
LOC accidents that were predominantly from the Part 121 category operations (both large transports and smaller 
regional aircraft).  These LOC accident precursors are called “causal and contributing factors” throughout this paper.  
The LOC accidents considered in this paper included accidents that involved vehicle upsets, as well as those 
involving failures, impairment, or damage to the flight control capability of the aircraft (including control surfaces, 
flight control system or components, and the engines) or to the vehicle airframe (when the damage was sufficient to 
alter vehicle dynamics and control characteristics) whether or not they led to an upset condition (or there was 
evidence of upset cited in the report).  Causal and contributing factors were identified from reading the full reports 
available for each accident (not through key word search), and these factors were categorized into three groups so 
that worst case combinations and sequences could be identified.  In understanding combinations of loss-of-control 
factors and how they occur sequentially, it may be possible to develop a holistic intervention strategy for breaking 
the sequences that result in loss of control accidents.   This is the primary motivation for the LOC accident analysis 
presented in this paper.  Section II contains the analysis results, and conclusions are given in Section III. 
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II. Aircraft Loss-of-Control Accident Analysis 
 
A review of 126 LOC accidents (predominantly from Part 121, including large transports and smaller regional 
carriers) occurring between 1979 and 2009 (30 years) and resulting in 6087 fatalities was performed for the analysis, 
and a listing of these accidents is provided in the Appendix.  This accident set does not represent an exhaustive 
search throughout this time period, and it does not include military, private, cargo, charter, and corporate accidents.  
Russian aircraft accidents were also excluded due to a general lack of detailed information in the associated reports.  
Of this total accident set, 91 accidents resulting in 4190 fatalities occurred between 1994 and 2009 (15 years).  The 
review was based on accident reports available on the Aviation Safety Network 5 and National Transportation Safety 
Board (NTSB) 6 websites.  The level of detail in analyzing each accident was therefore dependent on the level of 
detail provided in the accident reports.  Information from each report was transcribed into a categorized set of causal 
and contributing factors, using the following scheme.  The causal and contributing factors were grouped into three 
categories: adverse onboard conditions, vehicle upsets, and external hazards and disturbances.   
 
Adverse onboard conditions included:  
 
 vehicle impairment (including inappropriate vehicle configuration, contaminated airfoil, and improper 
vehicle loading);  
 system faults, failures, and errors (resulting from design flaws, software errors, or improper maintenance 
actions);  
 vehicle damage to airframe and engines (resulting from fatigue cracks, foreign objects, overstress during 
upsets or upset recovery, etc.); and  
 inappropriate crew response (including pilot-induced oscillations, spatial disorientation, mode confusion, 
ineffective recoveries, crew impairment, and failures to take appropriate actions).   
 
External hazards and disturbances included:  
 
 poor visibility;  
 wake vortices;  
 wind shear, turbulence, and thunderstorms;  
 snow and icing conditions; and  
 abrupt maneuvers for obstacle avoidance or collisions.   
 
Vehicle upsets included:  
 
 abnormal attitude;  
 abnormal airspeed, angular rates, or asymmetric forces;  
 abnormal flight trajectory;  
 uncontrolled descent (including spiral dive); and  
 stall/departure (including falling leaf and spin).   
 
A basic analysis of the contributions of each causal/contributing factor to the 126 accidents is given in Table 1.  It 
should be noted in Table 1 that the factors are not mutually exclusive.  For example, 119 LOC accidents involved 
one or more adverse onboard conditions, and the frequency of each individual factor within this category is listed.  
These numbers do not add up to 119, however, because there were many accidents involving more than one 
subfactor.  Similarly, adding the number of accidents listed for the three categories exceeds the 126 total because 
many accidents involved multiple categories.  The 23 accidents related to vehicle damage consisted of 20 airframe 
and system damage conditions, and 3 engine damage conditions.  Table I is useful for determining the number of 
accidents and fatalities associated with individual causal and contributing factors, but it does not provide any 
information on combinations or sequencing of these factors.  Nonetheless, this table identifies System 
Faults/Failures/Errors, Vehicle Impairment/Damage, Inappropriate Crew Response, Stall/Departure, Atmospheric 
Disturbances related to Wind Shear/Gusts, and Snow/Icing as the most significant contributors to the number of 
fatalities. The following subsections A and B address combinations and sequencing of LOC causal and contributing 
factors, respectively.  Subsection C addresses future risks. 
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Table 1. Contributions to LOC Accidents and Fatalities by   
Individual Causal and Contributing Factors 
 
Factor Accidents % Fatalities %
Adverse Onboard Conditions 119 94.4 5683 93.4
Vehicle Impairment 33 26.2 1134 18.6
System Faults / Failures / Errors 57 45.2 2807 46.1
Vehicle Damage 23 18.2 1780 29.2
Inappropriate Crew Response 54 42.8 2818 46.3
Vehicle Upsets 98 77.8 4523 74.3
Abnormal Attitude 18 14.3 219 3.60
Abnormal Airspeed / Angular Rates / Asymmetric Forces 14 11.1 701 11.5
Abnormal Flight Trajectory 4 3.2 272 4.47
Uncontrolled Descent 15 11.9 773 12.7
Stall / Departure 49 38.9 2622 43.1
External Hazards & Disturbances 61 48.4 3246 53.3
Poor Visibility 9 7.1 556 9.1
Wake Vortices 4 3.2 402 6.6
Wind Shear / Gusts / Thunderstorms 18 14.3 1126 18.5
Snow / Icing 28 22.2 595 9.8
Abrupt Maneuver / Collision 3 2.4 189 3.1
 
    
 
A. Analysis of Causal and Contributing Factor Combinations 
In order to identify worst case combinations of LOC causal and contributing factors (as defined by number of 
accidents and resulting fatalities), 3-dimensional scatter plots were generated, and Figure 2 shows the first such plot.  
The three dimensions are aligned with the three categories identified in Table 1.  Sphere size is directly proportional 
to the number of accidents, and sphere color depicts the number of fatalities as indicated by the legend.  As indicated 
in Figure 2, worst case combinations include: system faults and failures occurring alone and in combination with 
upsets, icing conditions resulting in vehicle impairment, and inappropriate crew response combined with upset 
conditions.  There are also a significant number of accidents and fatalities resulting from: vehicle damage occurring 
alone and combined with upsets, icing combined with inappropriate crew response and upsets, and wind shear and 
turbulence combined with inappropriate crew response and vehicle upsets.  It should be noted that there is some 
overlap (i.e., some combinations that are not mutually exclusive) in the scatter plot of Figure 2, especially within the 
adverse onboard conditions dimension.  This overlap is due to a significant number of accidents that involved 
multiple adverse onboard conditions.  For example, some of the accidents shown for system faults and failures also 
involved inappropriate crew response.  Alternatively, many of the accidents shown for inappropriate crew response 
also involved other adverse onboard conditions, such as vehicle impairment, failure, or damage.  Some of this 
overlap (especially for the largest number of accidents and fatalities) is identified in Figure 3.  While there is some 
overlap in the external hazards and disturbances and the vehicle upset dimensions, it is generally much smaller that 
the onboard dimension. 
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Figure 2.  Combinations of LOC Causal and Contributing Factors, 1979 – 2009.  
 
3 Accidents / 204 Fatalities
(2 Accidents with 196 Fatalities 
Also Involved Failures, Damage, 
or Impairment)
Adverse Onboard Conditions
External 
Hazards /
Disturbances
Vehicle 
Upset 
Conditions
None / Unkn.
Ab. Attitude
Ab. Trajectory
Stall / Depart.
Unc. Descent
Ab. Airspeed / 
Rates / Asym
15 Accidents / 522 Fatalities
(1 Accident with 47 Fatalities Also Involved 
Inappropriate Crew Response)
9 Accidents / 370 Fatalities
(5 Accidents with 219 Fatalities Also 
Involved Inappropriate Crew 
Response)
17 Accidents / 326 Fatalities
(4 Accidents with 55 Fatalities Also 
Involved Inappropriate Crew 
Response)
Sphere Size is
Directly Proportional to 
Number of Accidents 
Fatalities
0
1 – 99
100 – 199
200 – 299
300 ‐More14 Accidents / 778 Fatalities
(10 Accidents with 620 Fatalities 
Also Involved Failures, 
Damage, or Impairment)
 
Figure 3.  Identification of Overlap in LOC Causal and Contributing Factor Combinations, 1979 – 2009.  
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Figures 2 and 3 are based on the set of 126 accidents over the 30 year period analyzed in this study.  It could be 
argued that some of the factors associated with accidents that occurred longer ago than 15 years could have already 
been resolved.  While only 35 accidents in this data set occurred more than 15 years ago (i.e., between 1979 and 
1994), this potential effect was considered by removing them in the scatter plot of Figure 4.  As indicated in the 
figure, only minor differences are readily apparent.  Some of these include: a lower number of fatalities for icing 
with vehicle impairment, and a lower number of accidents and fatalities associated with vehicle damage.   
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Figure 4.  Combinations of LOC Causal and Contributing Factors, 1994 – 2009.  
 
 
It is also of interest to consider LOC accidents that resulted in no fatalities.  These accidents might be an 
indicator of conditions that were recoverable or of emerging trends leading to LOC fatal accident increases.  Figures 
5 and 6 show these plots for the 30 year and 15 year data, respectively. 
 
 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
 
 
7
Sphere Size is
Directly Proportional to 
Number of Accidents 
Adverse Onboard Conditions
External 
Hazards /
Disturbances
Vehicle 
Upset 
Conditions
None / Unkn.
Ab. Attitude
Ab. Trajectory
Stall / Depart.
Unc. Descent
Ab. Airspeed / 
Rates / Asym
 
Figure 5.  Combinations of LOC Causal and Contributing Factors for Nonfatal Accidents, 1979 – 2009.  
 
The results of Figures 5 and 6 are very similar.  This similarity indicates that many of the nonfatal accidents in the 
data set occurred during the more recent 15 year period (1994 – 2009).  The largest numbers of nonfatal accidents 
were associated with failures (with and without upsets), vehicle damage (without upsets), icing and the associated 
vehicle impairment (with upsets), and inappropriate crew response combined with upsets (with and without wind 
shear / turbulence and icing conditions).  It is not clear, however, whether these nonfatal accidents can be interpreted 
as emerging trends or simply as individual situations in which the crew was able to successfully recover.  The latter 
might be assumed in this case, since there were also many accidents and fatalities associated with these conditions. 
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Figure 6.  Combinations of LOC Causal and Contributing Factors for Nonfatal Accidents, 1994 – 2009.  
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B. Analysis of Causal and Contributing Factor Sequences 
An analysis of the time sequencing of the LOC causal and contributing factors was performed for the 30-year 
data set. Table 2 provides a summary of this sequencing.   
 
 
Table 2. Sequencing of LOC Accidents Causal and Contributing Factors 
Factor 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
Adverse Onboard Conditions 69 69 24 6 0
Vehicle Impairment 3 29 3 0 0
System Faults / Failures / Errors 42 11 4 0 0
Vehicle Damage 6 7 5 5 0
Inappropriate Crew Response 18 22 12 1 0
External Hazards & Disturbances 54 6 0 0 0
Poor Visibility 7 0 0 0 0
Wake Vortices 3 1 0 0 0
Wind Shear / Gusts / Thunderstorms 14 3 0 0 0
Snow / Icing 27 1 0 0 0
Abrupt Maneuver / Collision 3 1 0 0 0
Vehicle Upsets 3 36 47 15 1
Abnormal Attitude 0 12 3 3 0
Abnormal Airspeed / Angular Rates / 
Asymmetric Forces
0 3 7 4 0
Abnormal Flight Trajectory 1 1 3 1 0
Uncontrolled Descent 0 5 7 2 1
Stall / Departure 2 15 27 5 0
 
It should be noted that these sequences were identified without overlap.  That is, there is no “double bookkeeping” 
of sequences in Table 2.  Thus, the total number of initiating factors under column 1 sums to the total number of 
LOC accidents, since all LOC accidents result from at least 1 causal or contributing factor.  Table 2 indicates that 
LOC events are usually first precipitated by an adverse onboard condition or an external hazard or disturbance.  
Moreover, external hazards and disturbances rarely occur further downstream in LOC sequences.  Vehicle upsets are 
rarely the initial factor but rather an outcome of an external hazard or adverse onboard condition.  Within adverse 
onboard conditions, system faults, failures, and errors are the leading initial factor, and inappropriate crew response 
is the second most likely initial event.  Relative to external hazards and disturbances, the leading initial factor is 
icing, followed by wind shear, gusts, and thunderstorms.  Adverse onboard conditions are also the most likely factor 
to occur second in the chain of events leading to aircraft LOC, with vehicle impairment being the most likely 
secondary factor to occur.  This is due to vehicle impairment resulting from icing conditions (i.e., contaminated 
airfoil or reduced engine performance), faults or damage.  Vehicle upsets most often occur as the second, third, or 
fourth factor in the LOC sequence.  Only one 5-factor sequence was identified in this data set.   
An analysis was also performed of each LOC sequence.  This analysis is summarized in Table 3 and detailed in 
Figures 7 - 16.  Table 3 provides the number of accidents and fatalities (and associated percentages) relative to each 
causal and contributing factor as the initial factor in the LOC sequence.  Defining the LOC sequences in terms of the 
initiating factor allowed a comprehensive assessment without overlap.   
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Table 3. Summary of LOC Accident Sequences 
Initial Factor in LOC Sequence Accidents % Fatalities % Figures
Adverse Onboard Conditions 69 54.8 3733 61.3 7 - 10
Vehicle Impairment 3 2.4 186 3.1 7
System Faults / Failures / Errors 42 33.3 1544 29.0 8
Vehicle Damage 6 4.8 908 14.9 9
Inappropriate Crew Response 18 14.3 1095 14.3 10
External Hazards & Disturbances 54 42.8 2228 36.6 11-15
Poor Visibility 7 5.5 438 7.2 11
Wake Vortices 3 2.4 137 2.2 12
Wind Shear / Gusts / Thunderstorms 14 11.1 874 14.4 13
Snow / Icing 27 21.4 590 9.7 14
Abrupt Maneuver / Collision 3 2.4 189 3.1 15
Vehicle Upsets 3 2.4 126 2.1 16
Abnormal Attitude 0 0 0 0 -
Abnormal Airspeed / Angular Rates / 
Asymmetric Forces
0 0 0 0 -
Abnormal Flight Trajectory 1 0.8 117 1.9 16
Uncontrolled Descent 0 0 0 0 16
Stall / Departure 2 1.6 9 0.2 16
Totals 126 100 6087 100 7 - 16
 
 
As indicated in Table 3, LOC events initiated by adverse onboard conditions comprised 54.8% of the accidents 
and 61.3% of the fatalities within the data set considered in this analysis.  Of these, system failures, faults, and errors 
initiated 33.3% of accidents and 29% of fatalities, followed by inappropriate crew response, vehicle damage, and 
vehicle impairment.  External hazards and disturbances initiated 42.8% of the accidents and 36.6% of the fatalities 
in the LOC accidents considered.  Within this category, icing represented 21.4% of accidents and 9.7% of fatalities, 
whereas wind shear, turbulence, and thunderstorms initiated 11.1% of accidents and 14.4% of fatalities.  These 
factors were followed in frequency of occurrence by poor visibility, wake vortices, and abrupt maneuver or collision 
(with the last two having the same frequency of occurrence).  It is interesting to note that icing initiated more 
accidents, but wind-related disturbances resulted in more fatalities.  This is because the predominance of icing-
induced accidents in the data set of this study involved smaller aircraft, whereas the preponderance of wind-induced 
accidents in this data set involved large transports.  As indicated previously, vehicle upsets are rarely the 
precipitating factor in the LOC sequence, with these comprising 2.4% of the accidents and 2.1% of the fatalities 
considered in this study.  Within this category, stall/departure initiated 1.6% of the accidents and 0.2% of fatalities, 
and abnormal flight trajectory initiated 0.8% of accidents and 1.9% of fatalities in the data set.  While upsets are not 
usually the precipitating factor, many LOC sequences include vehicle upset somewhere in the chain of events (as 
indicated in Table 2).  The last column of Table 3 references the figures that present the detailed LOC sequences 
associated with each initial factor.  Sequences initiated by adverse onboard conditions are provided in Figures 7 - 10, 
those initiated by external hazards and disturbances are shown in Figures 11 – 15, and Figure 16 provides the 
sequences initiated by vehicle upsets.  Each figure lists the LOC sequence number on the left, and the accident 
identification number from the Appendix is identified on the right in parentheses.  The number of accidents and 
fatalities associated with each sequence is also provided. 
Figure 7 shows the 5 LOC sequences initiated by vehicle impairment, with the associated number of accidents 
and fatalities provided for each sequence.  The initiating events for these accidents included: aircraft overweight (1 
accident that was overloaded with passengers), inappropriate vehicle configuration (1 accident), and an emulated 
engine failure during a training flight (1 accident).  As indicated in Figure 7, 33% of these LOC sequences 
culminated in a vehicle upset, and 33% involved an inappropriate crew action or response.   
 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
 
 
10
 
Vehicle 
Impairment
Normal
Flight
Vehicle Impairment: 3 Accidents, 186 Fatalities:
Vehicle
Upset
LOC
Event 1 Accident, 154 Fatalities 
(14)
Inappropriate 
Crew Response
LOC
Event 1 Accidents, 8 Fatalities 
(90)
External 
Hazard 
Vehicle
Failure
LOC
Event 1 Accidents, 24 Fatalities 
(7)
33% Led to a Vehicle Upset, 33%  Involved Inappropriate Crew Response
1.
2.
3.
 
Figure 7.  LOC Accident Sequences Initiated by Vehicle Impairment.  
 
Figure 8 shows the 42 LOC sequences initiated by system failures.  The initiating events for these accidents 
included: engine and engine control failures (17 accidents), flight control sensors and instrumentation failures and 
malfunctions (9 accidents), flight control system and component design errors and failures (15 accidents), and flight 
deck warning system failures (1 accident).  External hazards and disturbances associated with these sequences 
included turbulence (2 accidents), wake vortices (1 accident), and an external obstruction (1 accident).  As indicated 
in Figure 8, 26% of these sequences involved only the failure condition, 57% of these sequences led to vehicle 
upset, and 26% involved inappropriate crew response.  All types of vehicle upsets (i.e., abnormal attitude; abnormal 
airspeed, angular rates, or asymmetric forces; abnormal flight trajectory; uncontrolled descent; and stall/departure) 
occurred in these LOC sequences.   
Figure 9 shows the 11 LOC sequences initiated by vehicle damage.  The precipitating damage events in these 
sequences included airframe structural damage (5 accidents) and engine damage (1 accident involving fatigue cracks 
in the engine).  As indicated in Figure 9, 83% of these sequences culminated in vehicle upset, and only 1 sequence 
involved inappropriate crew response.   
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Figure 8.  LOC Accident Sequences Initiated by Failures.  
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Figure 9.  LOC Accident Sequences Initiated by Damage.  
 
 
Figure 10 shows the 18 LOC sequences initiated by inappropriate crew actions.  These actions included: 
improper and inadvertent control inputs (9 accidents), crew impairment and distraction (3 accidents), spatial 
disorientation (2 accidents), failure to configure the vehicle properly (3 accidents), and improper pre-flight planning 
or preparation (1 accident).  As indicated in Figure 10, 100% of these sequences led to an upset condition, and 50% 
resulted in vehicle impairment or damage.   
Figures 11-15 show the LOC sequences that were initiated by external hazards and disturbances.  Figure 11 
shows the 7 sequences precipitated by poor visibility.  As indicated in the figure, 86% of these sequences culminated 
in a vehicle upset condition, and 86% involved inappropriate crew response.  Of the 6 sequences involving 
inappropriate crew response, 5 resulted from spatial disorientation.  Figure 12 shows the 3 LOC sequences initiated 
by a wake vortex encounter.  All of these sequences culminated in a vehicle upset.  Figure 13 shows the 14 LOC 
sequences initiated by wind shear, turbulence, and thunderstorms.  As indicated in the figure, 86% of these 
sequences led to a vehicle upset condition, and 64% involved inappropriate crew response.   
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Figure 10.  LOC Accident Sequences Initiated by Inappropriate Crew Input.  
 
 
 
Poor Visibility: 7 Accidents, 438 Fatalities:
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Visibility
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Flight Inappropriate 
Crew Response
Vehicle 
Upset
LOC
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Failure
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86% Led to a Vehicle Upset, 86%  Involved Inappropriate Crew Response
Inappropriate 
Crew Response
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Event 1 Accidents, 0 Fatalities
(9)
26.
27.
28.
29.
  
 
Figure 11.  LOC Accident Sequences Initiated by Poor Visibility.  
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Wake Vortex: 3 Accidents, 137 Fatalities:
Wake 
Vortex
Normal
Flight
LOC
Event 2 Accidents, 5 Fatalities
(57, 92)
Vehicle 
Upset
Wake 
Vortex
Normal
Flight
LOC
Event 1 Accident, 132 Fatalities
(85)
Vehicle 
Upset
Vehicle 
Failure
100% Led to a Vehicle Upset
30.
31.
 
Figure 12.  LOC Accident Sequences Initiated by Wake Vortex Encounter.  
 
Thunder‐
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Crew Response
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(80)
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Inappropriate 
Crew Response
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Upset
LOC
Event 2 Accidents, 74 Fatalities
(71, 99)
Vehicle 
Damage / 
Failures
Vehicle 
Upset
LOC
EventVehicle 
Failure
Inappropriate 
Crew Response 3 Accidents, 143 Fatalities(22, 86, 102)
86% Led to a Vehicle Upset, 64%  Involved Inappropriate Crew Response
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
 
Figure 13.  LOC Accident Sequences Initiated by Wind Shear, Gusts, & Thunderstorms. 
 
Figure 14 shows the 27 LOC sequences that were initiated by snow and icing conditions.  As indicated in the 
figure, 10% of these sequences led to a vehicle upset, and 22% involved inappropriate crew response.   
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Snow / Icing: 27 Accidents, 590 Fatalities:
Vehicle 
Upset
LOC
Event 14 Accidents, 367 Fatalities
(28, 35, 36, 38, 50, 55, 68, 69, 73,
84, 97, 101, 111, 123)
Vehicle 
Upset
LOC
Event 1 Accident, 6 Fatalities
(67)
Vehicle 
Failure
Vehicle 
Damage
LOC
Event
1 Accident, 2 Fatalities
(40)
Vehicle 
Upset
Icing
Normal
Flight
Vehicle 
Impairment
Vehicle 
Upset
LOC
Event 4 Accidents, 0 Fatalities
(34, 45, 46, 48)
Inappropriate 
Crew 
Response
Vehicle 
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LOC
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(6)
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Response
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
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Normal
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Vehicle 
Upset
LOC
Event 1 Accident, 0 Fatalities
(98) 
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Flight Vehicle 
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Upset
LOC
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(91)
Inappropriate 
Crew 
Response
Vehicle 
Upset
LOC
Event 1 Accident, 0 Fatalities
(94)Icing
Normal
Flight
100% Led to a Vehicle Upset, 22%  Involved Inappropriate Crew Response
Icing
Normal
Flight
Vehicle Failure / 
Damage
Vehicle 
Upset
LOC
Event 3 Accidents, 160 Fatalities
(32, 66, 126)45.
46.
47.
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Figure 14.  LOC Accident Sequences Initiated by Snow / Icing.  
 
 
Figure 15 shows the 3 LOC sequences that were initiated by abrupt maneuvers and collisions.  All of these 
sequences were initiated by a mid-air collision (1 with another aircraft, and 2 with a flock of birds).   
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Abrupt Maneuver / Collision: 3 Accidents, 189 Fatalities:
Abrupt 
Maneuver 
/ Collision
Normal
Flight
LOC
Event 3 Accidents, 189 Fatalities
(8, 24, 113)
Vehicle 
Damage49.
 
Figure 15.  LOC Accident Sequences Initiated by Abrupt Maneuver / Collision.  
 
 
 
Figure 16 shows the 7 LOC sequences initiated by vehicle upsets.  The precipitating event for these upsets was 
undetermined. The last accident associated with Sequence 52 occurred during a low-speed check to activate the 
alpha floor protection system following maintenance.  In this accident, the aircraft stalled on approach and recovery 
was impaired by the vehicle being configured inappropriately for go-around.  It is unclear at this time whether the 
initial stall condition resulted from incorrect or inappropriate flight procedures or an error in the flight control 
system. 
 
 
Abnormal Flight Trajectory: 1 Accident, 117 Fatalities:
Abnormal 
Flight 
Trajectory
Normal
Flight
LOC
Event 1 Accident, 117 Fatalities
(29)
Stall / Departure: 2 Accidents, 9 Fatalities:
Stall / 
Departure
Normal
Flight
LOC
Event
1 Accident, 2 Fatalities
(44)
Vehicle 
Impairment
Inappropriate 
Crew Response
LOC
Event 1 Accident, 7 Fatalities
(10)
50.
51.
52.
 
Figure 16.  LOC Accident Sequences Initiated by Vehicle Upsets.  
 
 In order to condense the LOC sequences of Figures 7-16 into smaller, more actionable groupings, these 
sequences can be combined and generalized.  In an effort to represent a large majority of the sequences identified in 
this study. Figure 17 shows the top 10 LOC combined sequences relative to number of accidents and fatalities.  
Dashed boxes represent factors that occurred in some subset within the sequence.  As indicated in Figure 17, this top 
10 set of combined LOC sequences represents 86.5% of the accidents and 89.1% of the fatalities considered in this 
study.  This set can be further reduced by generalizing the sequences.  Some generalized sequences are shown in 
Figure 18 along with the associated number of accidents and fatalities.  These 7 generalized sequences represent 112 
accidents (88.9%) and 5529 fatalities (90.8%).   
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Figure 17.  Top 10 LOC Accident Sequences.  
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Vehicle Problem / 
External Hazard
• Vehicle Impairment/Fault/Failure/Damage
• External Hazard or Disturbance
Inappropriate
Crew Response
Vehicle
Upset
• Poor Situational Awareness / Distraction
• Spatial Disorientation (Poor Visibility)
• Mode Confusion  (System Complexity)
• Abnormal Attitudes
• Abnormal Trajectory
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Event
B.  20 Accidents, 907 Fatalities: (V, VIII, IX)
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Vehicle
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Flight
LOC
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Vehicle Problem / 
External Hazard
• Vehicle Impairment/Fault/Failure
• External Hazard or Disturbance
Normal
Flight
LOC
Event
D.  16 Accidents, 484 Fatalities: (IV, 3, 32)
E.  8 Accidents, 569 Fatalities: (VI)
Normal
Flight
External 
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Vehicle Upset / 
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Event
LOC
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Failure / 
Damage
 
Figure 18.  Generalized LOC Accident Sequences.  
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C. Future Considerations 
 
In addition to looking at historical accident data, potential future LOC accident risks should be identified relative 
to known (as well as new) precursors.  This is more difficult, because (without data) it becomes more speculative.  
However, the identification of potential future risks might enable the development of a comprehensive intervention 
strategy that anticipates and mitigates these future potential risks.  One area of consideration is airspace operation 
under the Next Generation (NextGen) Air Transportation System. 7  The NextGen concept of operations provides an 
integrated view of airspace operations in the 2025 timeframe and includes high-density, all-weather, and self-
separation operational concepts.  There is also expected to be mixed-capability aircraft operating within the same 
airspace, including piloted aircraft and unmanned aircraft systems.  High-precision 4-D trajectories are envisioned 
that will enable safely flying with closer spacing to inclement weather, terrain, and other aircraft, and these 
trajectories can be altered if necessary during the flight.  Other areas of consideration include increasing airspace 
and vehicle system complexity without developing comprehensive methods for their validation and verification 
(V&V), and increased automation without improved crew interfaces. 
In an effort to identify areas of potential future LOC risk in terms of known precursors, Figure 19 illustrates 
several areas of possible increase in causal and contributing factors with the potential for increased LOC accidents 
or incidents.  If all-weather operations and highly precise trajectories that enable closer spacing to inclement weather 
increase the probability of an aircraft actually encountering inclement weather during flight, this could result in a 
larger number of weather-related LOC accidents (particularly in the terminal area).  If airspace and vehicle system 
complexity is increased without comprehensive methods for their V&V, this could lead to a larger number of LOC 
events initiated by system faults, failures, and errors.  If high-density mixed-vehicle operations and high-precision 
tracking that enables closer spacing between aircraft increase the probability of aircraft encountering other aircraft 
during flight, this could result in a larger incidence of wake-induced LOC events or ultimately those initiated by 
vehicle damage resulting from mid-air collisions.  Increased automation without improved crew interfaces could 
result in a higher incidence of LOC events precipitated by inappropriate crew actions.   
 
Adverse Onboard Conditions
External 
Hazards /
Disturbances
Vehicle Upset 
Conditions
None / Unknown
Abnormal Attitude
Ab. Va / Rates / Asym
Abnormal Trajectory
Uncontrolled Descent
Stall / Departure
All‐Weather 
Operations
Increased System 
Complexity Without 
Comprehensive V&V 
Process
High‐Density 
Mixed‐Vehicle 
Operations
Increased Automation 
Without  Improved 
Crew Interfaces
 
Figure 19.  Potential Areas of Future Increased LOC Risk.  
 
In order to consider LOC sequences that could become more prevalent under NextGen, Figure 20 shows 
summarized sequences grouped by relevance to NextGen operations.  High-density operations are represented by 
LOC sequences that were initiated by wake vortex encounters or mid-air collisions.  All-weather operations are 
represented by a summary of LOC sequences initiated by weather-related events.  Crew-automation vulnerability is 
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represented by LOC sequences that were initiated by system faults and crew errors.  Future intervention strategies 
for preventing LOC events will need to be able to provide interventions for these sequences with an emphasis on 
takeoffs and landings under wake and wind shear conditions, terminal area maneuvering and landing under vehicle 
impairment conditions while penetrating external disturbances, and self-separation and abrupt maneuvering for 
collision avoidance under all-weather and vehicle impairment conditions. 
Normal
Flight
Wake Vortex Vehicle Problem VehicleUpset
LOC
Event
3 Accidents, 137 Fatalities:
High‐Density Related Sequences:
Normal
Flight
LOC
Event3 Accidents, 189 Fatalities: External 
Hazard 
(Collision)
Vehicle 
Damage
 
Figure 20a.  Potential LOC Sequences Related to Future Risk (High-Density Related Sequences).  
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Impairment / 
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External 
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Damage
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Crew Input
Vehicle
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Event
7 Accidents, 143 Fatalities:
Inappropriate 
Crew Input
Normal
Flight
Vehicle
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LOC
Event
4 Accidents, 76 Fatalities:
Vehicle 
Impairment 
/ Failure / 
Damage
External 
Hazard
All‐Weather Related Sequences:
Normal
Flight
LOC
Event4 Accidents, 255 Fatalities: External 
Hazard
Vehicle 
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Flight
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Event
1 Accidents, 125 Fatalities: External Hazard Inappropriate Crew Response
 
Figure 20b.  Potential LOC Sequences Related to Future Risk (Weather Related Sequences).  
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Inappropriate Crew 
Input
Normal
Flight
Vehicle
Upset
LOC
Event
9 Accidents, 349 Fatalities:
Vehicle 
Failure
Normal
Flight Inappropriate Crew 
Response w/ or w/o  
Upset / Damage
External 
Hazard
LOC
Event
3 Accidents, 493 Fatalities:
Crew‐Automation Related Sequences:
Vehicle 
Impairment / 
Failure / 
Damage
Normal
Flight Inappropriate 
Crew Input
Vehicle
Upset
LOC
Event
6 Accidents, 304 Fatalities:
Vehicle 
Impairment
External 
Hazard
Normal
Flight
LOC
EventInappropriate 
Crew Input
Vehicle 
Upset
1 Accident, 5 Fatalities:
Vehicle 
Impairment / 
Damage
Inappropriate 
Crew Input
Vehicle
Upset
LOC
Event
Normal
Flight
7 Accidents, 741 Fatalities:
 
Figure 20c.  Potential LOC Sequences Related to Future Risk (Crew-Automation Related Sequences).  
 
 New LOC precursors associated with failure modes of future vehicle and airspace systems must also be 
identified and considered (particularly during V&V of these systems), and their potential ramifications considered 
(particularly under off-nominal operating conditions).  New types of crew-induced LOC precursors must also be 
considered. 
 
 
III. Conclusion 
 
Aircraft LOC accidents cause a significant percentage of aviation fatalities across all aircraft classes and 
operations, and result from a large number of causal and contributing factors that occur individually or (more often) 
in combination.  A detailed analysis of causal and contributing factors associated with aircraft LOC accidents 
(predominantly for Part 121 operations) has been performed and documented in this paper.  The LOC accidents 
considered in this paper included accidents that involved vehicle upsets, as well as those involving failures, 
impairment, or damage to the flight control capability of the aircraft (including control surfaces, flight control 
system or components, and the engines) or to the vehicle airframe (when the damage was sufficient to alter vehicle 
dynamics and control characteristics) whether or not they led to an upset condition (or there was evidence of upset 
cited in the report).  The data set used in the analysis consisted of 126 LOC accidents that resulted in 6087 fatalities 
during the 30-year period 1979 – 2009.  The analysis included the identification of worst case combinations of 
causal and contributing factors using scatter plots generated from the accident data, and a detailed compilation of 
LOC sequences based on temporal ordering of causal and contributing factors.  A list of the top 10 LOC 
summarized sequences was developed, which represents 86.5% of the accidents and 89.1% of the fatalities 
considered in this paper.  A set of 7 generalized LOC sequences was also defined, which are representative of 88.9% 
of the accidents and 90.8% of the fatalities considered in this study.  The data set was analyzed for trends potentially 
attributable to the introduction of new technologies in the last 15 years.  This analysis showed little effect.  The data 
was also analyzed for differences between nonfatal and fatal accidents.  This analysis also did not yield significant 
results.  Finally, future risks with the potential to increase LOC accidents were considered.  Research in the 
development of holistic intervention strategies that can prevent LOC accidents under current and future airspace 
operations is recommended.  
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Appendix 
 
Date Aircraft / Airline Location 
Fatalities 
(Total 
Onboard)
Phase of Flight Accident Summary 
Probable   Primary   
Cause 
Accident 
No. 
9/24/2009 British 
Aerospace 
4121 
Jetstream 41, 
ZS-NRM /   
SA Airlink   
Merebank, Near 
Durban 
International 
Airport         
South Africa 
0 Takeoff System / Component 
Failure - Engine 
Engine Failure 
1 
8/3/2009 B707,  EP-
SHK /       
Saha Air     
(Flt. 124)    
Ahwaz Airport,   
Iran 
0 Cruise Uncontained Engine 
Failure Resulting in 
Unknown Level of 
Vehicle Damage 
System / Component 
Failure - Engine 
2 
7/13/2009 B737,  
N387SW /   
Southwest 
Airlines     
(Flt. 2294)   
Near Charleston, 
WV,  USA 
0 Cruise Vehicle suffered 
rapid decompression 
resulting from a hole 
in the fuselage 
measuring 17"x8" 
Damage to fuselage from 
unknown source  
3 
6/1/2009 A330,   F-
GZCP /     
Air France   
~160 km NNW 
off Sao Pedro and 
Sao Paulo 
Archipelago in 
the Atlantic 
Ocean 
228 (228) Cruise Instrument failure of 
the Air Data Inertial 
Reference Unit 
(ADIRU), possibly 
coupled with severe 
turbulence 
System/Component 
Failure - Airspeed 
Instrumentation 
4 
2/25/2009 B737, TC-
JGE /       
Turk Hava 
Yollari      
(Flt. 1951)   
1.5 km N of 
Amsterdam-
Schiphol 
International 
Airport         
Netherlands 
9 (135) Approach/Landing Possible fault with 
radio altimeter, 
Possible fault in 
autothrottle system, 
Possible mode 
confusion by crew, 
Aircraft Stall 
System/Component 
Error - Flight Control 
System (Flight systems 
drove aircraft into a stall) 5 
2/12/2009 de Havilland 
Canada 
DHC-8, 
N200WQ /   
Colgan Air   
(Flt. 3407)   
10 km NE of 
Buffalo Niagara 
International 
Airport, NY 
49 (49)    
+1 on 
Ground 
Approach Vehicle stall possibly 
due to vehicle 
impairment from 
icing combined with 
inappropriate crew 
input for recovery 
Inappropriate Crew 
Response During Stall 
Recovery 
6 
2/7/2009 Embraer 110, 
PT-SEA /    
Manaus 
Aerotaxi     
Off Santo 
Antonio, AM    
Brazil 
24 (28) Cruise Loss of control due 
to weather, engine 
failure, and possible 
overloaded condition
System and Component 
Failure - Engine 
7 
1/15/2009 A320,   
N106US /    
US Airways  
(Flt. 1549) 
Off Weehawkin, 
NJ [Hudson 
River, NY]   USA 
0 Takeoff - Initial 
Climb 
Damage to both 
engines due to 
impact with flock of 
geese 
Vehicle Damage - 
Engines 
8 
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1/4/2009 Cessna 550,  
N815MA /   
Caribair, 
S.A.        
Wilmington-New 
Hanover County 
International 
Airport, NC, 
USA 
0 Approach/Landing Poor Visibility 
forced 3 Missed 
Approaches, Loss of 
both engines due to 
low fuel on fourth 
approach 
Inappropriate Crew 
Action Resulting in 
Vehicle Impairment - 
Engines 
9 
11/27/2008 A320,   D-
AXLA /     
XL Airways 
Germany    
(Leased from 
Air New 
Zealand)    
5 km E off       
Canet-Plage,     
France 
7 (7) Approach / Go-
Around (following 
maintenance 
during a low-
speed check to 
activate the alpha 
floor protection 
system) 
Aircraft was flown 
into stall on  
approach by crew 
and/or flight control 
system during 
checkout  flight –  
recovery was 
impaired by the 
vehicle being 
configured 
inappropriately for 
go-around 
Stall 
10 
10/7/2008 A330,   VH-
QPA /       
Qantas      
(Flt. QF72)  
154 km W of  
Learmonth, WA,  
Australia 
0 Cruise Failure of the air data 
IRU resulting in 
uncommanded pitch 
downs during cruise
System and Component 
Failure - ADIRU 
11 
9/14/2008 B737,   VP-
BKO /      
Aeroflot-
Nord       
(Flt. 821)    
11.5 km NE of   
Perm Airport,    
Russia 
88 (88) Approach Uncontrolled descent 
resulting from spatial 
disorientation of the 
crew and possible 
atmospheric 
disturbances 
Crew Spatial 
Disorientation 
12 
9/1/2008 Convair 580, 
N587X /     
Air Tahoma  
1.6 km SW of 
Columbus-
Rickenbacker 
International 
Airport, OH,  
USA 
3 (3) Emergency 
Landing 
Loss-of-Control 
resulting from 
reverse rigging of 
elevator trim cables
Elevator System Failure
13 
8/20/2008 MD-82,  EC-
HFP /       
Spanair     
(Flt. 5022)   
Madrid-Barajas 
Airport,         
Spain 
154 (172) Takeoff  Stall During Takeoff 
Resulting from 
Inappropriate 
Vehicle 
Configuration 
Stall - Inappropriate 
Vehicle Configuration 
14 
7/7/2008 B747,  
N714CK /   
Centurion 
Air Cargo    
8 km N of 
Bogota-Eldorado 
Airport,       
Colombia 
0         
+3 on 
ground 
Takeoff - Initial 
Climb 
Engine Fire during 
Initial Climb 
Engine Failure 
15 
6/10/2008 A310,  ST-
ATN /      
Sudan 
Airways     
(Flt. 109)    
Khartoum-Civil 
Airport,         
Sudan 
30 (214) Landing Aircraft crashed on 
landing, possibly due 
to wind shear 
Atmospheric 
Disturbance 
16 
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5/2/2008 Beechcraft 
1900,  5Y-
FLX /       
Southern 
Sudan Air 
Connection  
45km NW of 
Rumbek,        
Sudan 
21 (21) Cruise Failure of both 
engines during cruise
Engine Failure 
17 
2/7/2008 Britten-
Norman BN-
2A,  HI-
653CA /     
Caribair, 
S.A. 
El Seibo,        
Dominican 
Republic 
0 Enroute Crash-landed after 
Engine Failure 
Engine Failure 
18 
1/17/2008 B777, G-
YMMM /    
British 
Airways 
London-
Heathrow 
Airport,         
United Kingdom 
0 Landing Engines failed to 
respond to increased 
thrust command 
from autothrottle and 
from flight crew 
advancing the 
throttle levers, 
Aircraft entered an 
uncontrolled descent
System and Component 
Failure - Engines 
19 
1/4/2008 Let 410, 
YV2081 /    
Transaven   
20 km S of Los 
Roques Airport,  
Venezuela 
14 (14) Descent Failure of both 
engines 
System and Component 
Failure - Engines 
20 
5/5/2007 B737-800,   
5Y-KYA /   
Kenya 
Airways 
5.5 km SE of 
Douala Airport   
Cameroon 
114 (114) Takeoff - Initial 
Climb 
Vehicle Upset 
resulting from 
possible wind shear 
and/or inappropriate 
crew response 
Atmospheric 
Disturbances, 
Inappropriate Crew 
Response 21 
1/1/2007 B737-4Q8   
PK-KKW /   
AdamAir 
85 km (53.1 mls) 
W off 
Pambauang,   
Indonesia 
102 (102) Cruise Crew distracted with 
trouble-shooting the 
IRS, loss of 
situational awareness 
& spatial 
disorientation during 
upset 
Loss of Situational 
Awareness During 
Failure, Leading to Upset
22 
10/29/2006 B737-2B7   
5N-BFK /    
ADC 
Airlines 
Near Abuja Int. 
Airport (ABV)   
Nigeria 
96 (105)   
+1 on 
Ground 
Takeoff Stall, possibly 
resulting from wind 
shear and gusts 
Stall 
23 
9/29/2006 B737-8EH   
PR-GTD /   
GOL 
Transportes 
Aereos 
30 km from 
Peixoto Azevedo, 
MT            
Brazil 
154 (154) Cruise Mid-Air Collision 
Resulting in Vehicle 
Damage 
Mid-Air Collision 
24 
7/10/2006 Fokker F-27 
Friendship 
200 AP-BAL 
/           
Pakistan 
International 
Airlines 
Near Multan 
Airport (MUX)   
Pakistan 
45 (45) Takeoff – Struck 
Electrical Power 
Lines 
Engine failure on 
takeoff leading to 
collision with 
external hazard 
(power lines) 
Engine Failure 
25 
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7/9/2006 Airbus 
A.310-324 F-
OGYP /     
S7 Airlines 
Irkutsk Airport 
(IKT)           
Russia 
125 (203) Landing – Over-
ran Runway 
Rain/Thunderstorms, 
During landing pilot 
inadvertently 
touched #1 power 
lever increasing 
thrust - No. 1 engine 
thrust reverser de-
activated & set to 
idle, No.2 thrust 
reverser deployed 
Inappropriate crew 
inputs  
26 
5/3/2006 Airbus 
A.320-211 
EK-32009 /  
Armavia     
(Flt. 967) 
6 km SW Off 
Adler/Sochi 
Airport (AER) 
Russia 
113 (113) Approach 
(Aborted – 
Climbing Turn 
Maneuver) 
Inappropriate crew 
inputs (excessive 
nose down pitch 
commands) resulting 
from possible wind 
shear leading to 
uncontrolled descent
Inappropriate crew 
inputs  
27 
1/2/2006 Saab-340    
N-380AE /   
American 
Eagle 
Over           
Santa Maria, CA  
USA 
0 Climb Vehicle upset 
resulting from icing 
conditions 
Icing 
28 
10/22/2005 B737,  5N-
BFN /      
Bellview 
Airlines 
Near Lisa       
Nigeria 
117 (117) Takeoff Abnormal flight 
trajectory on takeoff
Undetermined 
29 
9/5/2005 B737-230,   
PK-RIM /    
Mandala 
Airlines 
Medan-Polonia 
Airport         
Indonesia 
100 (117)  
+49 on 
Ground 
Takeoff - Initial 
Climb 
Airplane failed to 
become airborne due 
to inappropriate 
vehicle configuration 
- flaps and slats were 
not deployed 
Inappropriate vehicle 
configuration resulting 
from crew error 
30 
9/5/2005 B737,  PR-
BRY /   
  0 Cruise Vehicle driven into 
an upset condition by 
the autopilot 
Autopilot Failure  
31 
8/16/2005 MD-80, HK-
4374X /     
West 
Caribbean 
Airways     
(Flt 708) 
Near Machiques  
Venezuela 
160 (160) Cruise Stall resulting from 
possible engine icing 
condition or failure
Stall, Engine 
Failure/Impairment 
32 
8/1/2005 B777, 9M-
MRG /      
Malaysia 
Airlines     
(Flt 124) 
240 km NW of 
Perth, WA       
Australia 
0 Climb Fault in flight control 
instrumentation 
system and software 
leading to vehicle 
upset (Software error 
allowed faulty sensor 
to be used by 
primary flight 
control system) 
Flight control system 
fault 
33 
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5/27/2005 DHC-8, C-
GZKH /     
Provincial 
Airlines 
Limited 
Near 
Newfoundland 
0 Takeoff - Initial 
Climb 
Vehicle Stall during 
initial climb Induced 
by Icing and coupled 
with inappropriate 
crew response (Crew 
Interpreted Upset as 
Severe Turbulence, 
which Delayed 
Effective Stall 
Recovery) 
Stall, Icing 
34 
11/28/2004 Canadair CL-
600, N873G / 
Global 
Aviation     
(Flt 73) 
Montrose County 
Airport, CO      
USA 
3 (6) Takeoff Stall Induced by 
Icing during takeoff
Stall, Icing 
35 
11/21/2004 Canadair CL-
600, B-3072 
/           
China 
Yunnan 
Airlines     
(Flt 5210) 
Near Baotou 
Airport         
China 
53 (53)    
+2 on 
Ground 
Takeoff - Initial 
Climb 
Stall induced by 
Icing during initial 
climb  
Stall, Icing 
36 
10/14/2004 Canadair CL-
600, N8396A 
/           
Pinnacle 
Airlines / 
Northwest 
Airlink      
(Flt 3701) 
Jefferson City, 
MO            USA 
2 (2) Approach Stall Induced by 
Engine Failure 
(Double Engine 
Flame-Out) 
Stall, Engine Failure 
37 
6/18/2004 Saab-SF340  
VH-KEQ /   
83 km SW 
Albury          
Australia 
0 Descent Contaminated Airfoil 
due to Icing 
Stall due to Icing 
38 
1/3/2004 B737-300    
SU-ZCF /    
Flash 
Airlines     
(Flt 604) 
Red Sea, Near 
Sharm El-Sheikh, 
Eqypt 
148 (148) Takeoff Loss of Control 
resulting from 
inappropriate control 
actions by the crew 
due to spatial 
disorientation 
Spatial Disorientation, 
Spiral Dive 
39 
10/3/2003 Convair CV-
580, ZK-
KFU /       
Air Freight 
NZ         
(Flt 642) 
10 km N off 
Paraparaumu,    
New Zealand 
2 (2) Initial Descent Icing-induced stall 
and departure 
resulting in severe 
vehicle damage 
Stall, Icing and Damage
40 
7/8/2003 B737, ST-
AFK /       
Sudan 
Airways     
(Flt 139) 
5 km E of       
Port Sudan      
Sudan 
116 (117) Missed Approach Loss of control due 
to engine failure 
Engine Failure 
41 
 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
 
 
27
4/23/2003 Beechcraft 
99,         
C-FDYF /   
Transwest 
Air         
(Flt 602) 
11 km from 
Prince Albert, SK 
Canada 
0 Approach Vehicle upset 
resulting from Flight 
control system 
failure (Horizontal 
stabilizer failure / 
detachment resulting 
from improper 
maintenance) 
Flight control system 
failure 
42 
1/8/2003 Beechcraft 
1900,       
N233YV /   
US Airways 
Express     
(Flt 5481) 
Charlotte-
Douglas 
International 
Airport, NC      
USA 
21 (21) Takeoff - Initial 
Climb 
Loss of pitch control 
due to flight control 
system fault (Fault of 
the elevator system 
due to an improper 
maintenance action)
Flight control system 
fault 
43 
12/21/2002 Aerospatiale 
ATR-72, B-
22708 /      
Transasia 
Airways (Flt 
791) 
11.3 km NW off 
Pachao Tao, 
Penghu Islands   
(Taiwan) 
2 (2) Cruise - During 
Descent 
Stall during descent 
(undetermined cause)
Stall 
44 
12/7/2002 A-320, C-
GJVX /     
Air Canada  
(Flt 457) 
Lester B. Pearson 
International 
Airport, Toronto, 
Ontario, Canada 
0 Landing Vehicle Upset (roll 
oscillation on 
landing) due to 
possible 
contaminated airfoil 
from icing or PIO 
Upset/PIO due to 
Contaminated Airfoil 
45 
12/7/2002 A-320, C-
GIUF /      
Air Canada  
(Flt 1130) 
Lester B. Pearson 
International 
Airport, Toronto, 
Ontario, Canada 
0 Landing - During 
Go Around 
Vehicle Upset (roll 
oscillation on 
landing) due to 
possible 
contaminated airfoil 
from icing or PIO 
Upset/PIO due to 
Contaminated Airfoil 
46 
10/20/2002 B757-200, 
TF-FII /     
Icelandair    
(Flt 662) 
Near Baltimore-
Washington 
International 
Airport, MD     
USA 
0 Cruise - During 
Vehicle Climb 
Stall induced by 
system anomalies 
(Instrument problem 
with flight director 
and airspeed 
indicator displays 
and/or Air Data 
Computer) and 
possible loss of crew 
situational awareness
Stall, Instrumentation 
Error 
47 
6/28/2002 Saab SF-340, 
VH-OLM /   
Hazelton 
Airlines     
(Flt 185) 
7 km ESE of 
Bathurst, NSW   
Australia 
0 Approach Vehicle upset/stall 
induced by icing  and 
Failure by crew to 
activate de-icing 
system 
Icing coupled with crew 
inaction 
48 
6/14/2002 A-340, C-
GHLM /   
Air Canada  
(Flt. 875) 
Frankfurt 
Germany ILS 
Facility 
0 Approach Possible Autopilot 
Fault - Pitch to 27 
deg during 
glideslope capture 
System Fault 
49 
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6/4/2002 MD-80, 
N823NK /   
Spirit 
Airlines     
(Flt 970) 
37 km W of 
Wichita, KS     
USA 
0 Cruise Autopilot-induced 
stall resulting from 
icing (Engine power 
loss resulting from 
false engine pressure 
ratio indication 
caused by icing of 
engine inlet probes 
while in Autopilot 
Mode) 
Stall 
50 
5/4/2002 British 
Aircraft 
Corp. 111, 
5N-ESF /   
Executive 
Airline 
Services     
(Flt. 4226) 
Kano,          
Nigeria 
71 (77)    
+ 78 on 
Ground 
Shortly afer 
Takeoff 
Stall, Possibly 
Resulting from 
Engine Failure 
Stall 
51 
1/4/2002 Canadair CL-
600, N90AG 
/           
Epps Air 
Service      
(Executive 
Flight) 
Birmingham 
International 
Airport,         
United Kingdom 
5 (5) Takeoff - Initial 
Climb 
Stall due to 
contaminated airfoil 
coupled with 
Possible impairment 
of crew due to 
combined effects of 
non-prescription 
drug, jet-lag, and 
fatigue 
Stall 
52 
12/20/2001 Cessna 560 
Citation V,   
HB-VLV /   
Eagle Air    
(Flt. 220) 
Zurich-Kloten 
Airport,         
Switzerland 
2 (2) Takeoff - Initial 
Climb 
Spatial disorientation 
resulting from poor 
visibility 
Crew Spatial 
Disorientation 
53 
11/12/2001 A300-605R 
N14053 /   
American 
Airlines     
(Flt 587) 
Belle Harbor, NY 
USA 
260 (260)  
+ 5 on 
ground 
Takeoff Pilot-Induced 
Vehicle Damage 
brought on by 
excessive and 
unnecessary reaction 
to wake vortex 
encounter 
Atmospheric 
Disturbance and 
Inappropriate Crew 
Response 54 
3/19/2001 Embraer 120, 
N266CA /   
Comair/Delta 
Connection  
(Flt. 5054) 
Near West Palm 
Beach, FL       
USA 
0 Descent Stall Resulting from 
Icing Conditions 
Stall, Icing 
55 
12/27/2000 Embraer 120, 
N721HS /    
American 
Eagle       
(Flt. 230) 
O'Hare 
International 
Airport,         
Chicago, IL      
USA 
0 Takeoff - Initial 
Climb 
Pitch Control System 
Design Flaw 
Resulting in 
Excessive Nose-Up 
Trim, Jammed 
Stabilizer 
Flight Control System 
Failure 
56 
10/26/2000 Bombardier 
CL-600, 
N958CA /   
Comair 
Falmouth, KY    
USA 
0 Cruise Vehicle Upset 
Induced by Wake 
Vortex Encounter 
Atmospheric 
Disturbance, Wake 
57 
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10/2/2000 A340, TC-
JDN /       
Turkish 
Airlines 
North Atlantic 0 Cruise Flight Control Mode 
Change Triggered by 
Severe Turbulence 
Encounter, Coupled 
with Crew Mode 
Confusion 
Atmospheric 
Disturbance,  
Turbulence 
58 
8/23/2000 A320, A40-
EK /      Gulf 
Air         
(Flt. 072) 
2 km N off 
Nahrain 
International 
Airport,         
Bahrain 
143 (143) Approach (During 
a Go-Around) 
Inappropriate control 
input by crew 
resulting from spatial 
disorientation (which 
caused pilot to 
falsely perceive 
aircraft was pitching 
up and to input a 
nose down 
command) 
Human Factors - 
Inappropriate crew 
response 
59 
3/30/2000 B767, 
N182DN /   
Delta 
Airlines     
(Flt. 106) 
New York City, 
NY, USA 
0 (225 
Injuries) 
Takeoff - Initial 
Climb 
Upset caused by 
Crew Spatial 
Disorientation under 
Poor Visibility 
Upset, Inappropriate 
Crew Input 
60 
2/27/2000 B747, G-
BDXL /     
British 
Airways     
(Flt. 179) 
Near Providence, 
RI,   USA 
0  (12 
Serious 
Injuries) 
Approach - Initial 
Descent 
Possible Autopilot 
Anomaly Resulting 
from an 
Inappropriate 
maintenance action
Autopilot Induced Upset
61 
2/16/2000 DC-8, 
N8079U /    
Emery 
Worldwide   
(Flt. 17) 
Sacramento, CA  
USA 
3 (3) Takeoff - Initial 
Climb 
Elevator failure at 
lift-off caused by an 
improper 
maintenance action 
(Loss of pitch control 
resulting from the 
disconnection of the 
right elevator control 
tab) 
Flight Control System 
Failure 
62 
1/31/2000 MD-83 
N963AS /    
Alaska 
Airlines     
(Flt 261) 
~2.7 Miles N of 
Anacapa Island, 
CA            
USA 
88 (88) Cruise Failure of Horizontal 
Stabilizer Trim 
System Jackscrew 
Assembly (Improper 
Maintenance) 
Flight Control System 
Failure 
63 
1/10/2000 Saab 340B,  
HB-AKK /   
Crossair     
(Flt 498) 
Near Nassenwil,  
Switzerland 
10 (10) Takeoff - Climb Vehicle upset (spiral 
dive) due to spatial 
disorientation of 
crew 
Human Factors - 
Inappropriate crew 
response due to Spatial 
Disorientation 64 
12/22/1999 B747, 
HL7451 /    
Korean Air   
(Flt. 8509) 
Near Great 
Hallingbury,     
United Kingdom 
4 (4) Takeoff - Initial 
Climb 
Vehicle Upset 
During Initial Climb 
Resulting from 
Instrument Failure 
System & Component 
Failure 
65 
10/18/1999 Saab SF-340, 
SE-LES /    
GAO       
(Flt 750) 
  0   Autopilot-Induced 
Stall under Icing 
Conditions 
Stall, Icing 
66 
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4/7/1999 B737, TC-
JEP /       
Turk Hava 
Yollari 
Near Ceyhan,    
Turkey 
6 (6) Takeoff - Climb Stall due to Icing, 
Erratic Airspeed 
Indication - Possibly 
due to icing of  
pitot static tube 
Stall, Icing 
67 
11/11/1998 Saab 340B,  
VH-LPI  /   
Kendell 
Airlines     
Eildon Weir, VIC 
Australia 
0 Holding Pattern Stall due to Icing Stall, Icing 
68 
6/16/1998 Saab 340, 
SE-LEP /    
GAO       
(Flt. 758) 
  0   Autopilot-Induced 
Stall under Icing 
Conditions 
Stall, Icing 
69 
2/16/1998 A300, B-
1814 /       
China 
Airlines     
(Flt. 676) 
Taipei,          
Taiwan 
196 (196)  
+7 on 
ground 
Approach - 
During Go-
Around 
Autopilot-Induced 
Stall  
Autopilot 
70 
10/10/1997 DC-9-32, 
LV-WEG /   
Austral 
Lineas 
Aereas      
(Flt. 2553) 
Near Nuevo 
Berlin,          
Uruguay        
74 (74) Cruise / Initial 
Descent 
Vehicle Upset 
(uncontrolled 
descent) due to High-
Speed Slat/Flap 
Extension by Crew 
Causing Vehicle 
Asymmetry, Possibly 
Exacerbated by 
Weather (Wind 
Shear) Conditions 
Flight Control System 
Configuration 
Asymmetry 
71 
5/12/1997 A300, 
N90070/     
American 
Airlines     
(Flt. 903) 
West Palm 
Beach, FL       
USA 
0 Approach - Initial 
Descent 
Improper Use of 
Autothrottle by Crew 
which resulted in 
loss of airspeed and 
stall, Forces during 
the upset exceeded 
the design limit for 
the vertical tail 
Stall 
72 
1/9/1997 Embraer-120 
/           
Comair/Delta 
Connection  
(Flt 3272) 
Near Monroe, MI 
USA 
29 (29) Approach Uncontrolled descent 
following icing 
encounter 
Icing, stall 
73 
12/22/1996 DC-8 /      
Airborne 
Express     
(Flt. 827) 
6.5 km W of 
Narrows, VA    
USA 
6 (6) Cruise Stall Followed by 
Falling Leaf Upset,  
Inappropriate 
Control Inputs for 
Stall Recovery, 
Inoperative Stall 
Warning System 
Inappropriate crew 
training for stall recovery 
(inadequate training 
simulator fidelity in 
reproducing airplane's 
stall characteristics) 74 
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10/31/1996 Fokker 100, 
PT-MRK /   
TAM Brasil  
(Flt. 402) 
Congonhas 
Airport,         
Sao Paulo,       
Brazil 
95 (95)    
+4 on 
Ground 
Takeoff – Aircraft 
Failed to Gain 
Altitude & 
Collided with Tall 
Building 
Stall Resulting from 
Inadvertent 
Deployment of 
Thrust Reverser on 
No. 2 Engine 
resulting in 
Asymmetric Forces 
on Aircraft 
Stall - Engine 
Impairment Resulting 
from Inadvertent 
Deployment of Thrust 
Reverser 75 
6/9/1996 B737-200, 
N221US / 
Eastwind 
Airlines     
(Flt. 517) 
Near Richmond, 
VA            
USA 
0         
(Incident)
Approach Rudder System 
Malfunction (Rudder 
Reversal) 
Flight Control System 
Failure 
76 
2/6/1996 B757-200, 
TC-GEN / 
Birgenair    
(Flt. 301) 
26 km NE off 
Puerto Plata,     
Dominican 
Republic 
189 (189) Takeoff Aircraft Stall 
Resulting from 
Faulty 
Instrumentation 
(Blocked Pitot Tube 
Resulting in 
Erroneous Airspeed 
Readings to 
Autopilot and Pilot), 
Poor Situational 
Awareness and 
Reaction by Crew to 
Faulty Airspeed 
Indicator 
Flight Control System 
Failure 
77 
2/4/1996 DC-8, HK-
3979X / 
LAC 
Colombia    
(Cargo) 
2 km N of 
Asuncion-Silvo 
Pettirossi 
International 
Airport,   
Paraguay 
4 (4)      
+ 20 on 
Ground 
Takeoff - Initial 
Climb 
2 Engines Throttled 
Back on Same Wing 
During Unauthorized 
Single Engine-Out 
Training (Gear 
Down and Flaps at 
15 deg) 
Vehicle upset 
(asymmetric forces and 
reduced airspeed) Due to 
Unauthorized Engine 
Throttle Back 78 
12/3/1995 B737-200, 
TJ-CB  /     
Cameroon 
Airlines 
Douala,         
Cameroon 
71 (76) Approach / Go-
Around 
Engine Failure on 
Go-Around 
Flight Control System 
Failure - Engines 
79 
4/27/1995 A320, 
N331NW /   
Northwest 
Airlines     
(Flt. 352) 
Washington D.C., 
USA 
0 Visual Approach Inappropriate control 
input by crew (PIO) 
in response to wind 
gusts 
PIO 
80 
3/31/1995 A310, YR-
LCC /       
Tarom      
(Flt. 371) 
Near Balotesti,   
Romania 
60 (60) Takeoff / Climb Engine Failed to 
Advance Resulting 
in Thrust 
Asymmetry, Possible 
Pilot Incapacitation
Engine Failure 
81 
12/13/1994 Jetstream 32, 
N918AE /   
American 
Eagle       
(Flt. 3379) 
7.4 km SW of 
Raleigh/Gurham 
Airport, NC      
USA 
15 (20) Approach Inappropriate Crew 
Response to  
Possible Engine 
Failure on Approach 
and Ineffective Stall 
Recovery 
Vehicle Stall Resulting 
from Inappropriate Crew 
Control Inputs 
82 
 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
 
 
32
12/11/1994 B737, 
N681MA /   
Markair     
(Flt. 308) 
Anchorage, 
Alaska        USA 
0 Climb Vehicle Upset 
Resulting from 
Autopilot Elevator 
Actuator Failure 
Flight Control System 
Failure 
83 
10/31/1994 ATR-72, 
N401AM /   
American 
Eagle       
(Flt 4184) 
Near Roselawn, 
IN             
USA 
68 (68) Approach - 
Holding 
Vehicle Impairment 
under Icing 
Conditions Resulting 
in Aircraft Stall 
(Sudden and 
Unexpected Aileron 
Hinge Moment 
Reversal Resulting 
from Contaminated 
Airfoil) 
Icing, stall 
84 
9/8/1994 B737-300    
N513AU / 
USAir    (Flt 
427) 
Near Pittsburg, 
PA (Aliquippa)   
USA 
132 (132) Approach Vehicle stall 
resulting from 
Rudder System 
Failure (rudder 
reversal) subsequent 
to a wake encounter
Flight Control System 
Failure, Stall 
85 
7/2/1994 DC-9, 
N954VJ /    
USAir      
(Flt. 1016) 
Charlotte-
Douglas 
International 
Airport, NC,    
USA 
37 (57) Approach - 
During Go-
Around 
Vehicle stall 
resulting from wind 
shear encounter, 
Failure of Wind 
Shear Warning 
System to Activate 
(Due to inadequate 
software logic), 
Thrust Setting was 
below standard go-
around EPR limit of 
1.93 
Atmospheric 
Disturbance, Wind 
Shear, Resulting in Stall
86 
6/29/1994 MD-11, 
N1752K /    
American 
Airlines     
(Flt. 901) 
Over the 
Caribbean Sea, 
South of Cuba 
0         
(1 Serious 
Injury) 
Cruise Vehicle Upset 
Resulting from 
Inappropriate 
Control Input by 
Crew (Unintended 
Control Column 
Input resulting from 
inadvertent 
movement of the first 
officer's seat) 
Inappropriate/Inadvertent 
Control Input by Crew 
87 
4/26/1994 A300, B-
1816 /       
China 
Airlines     
(Flt. 140) 
Nagoya-Komaki, 
Japan 
264 (271) Approach  Vehicle Stalled as a 
result of inadvertent 
control setting on 
approach 
(Inadvertent 
Engagement of Take 
Off Go Around 
(TOGA) Mode) and 
Abnormal Out-of-
Trim Condition  
Stall, Inappropriate 
control input by crew 
88 
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3/23/1994 A310, F-
OGQS /     
Aeroflot 
Russian 
International 
Airlines     
(Flt. 593) 
Near 
Mezhduretshensk, 
Russia 
75 (75) Cruise Aircraft stalled as a 
result of inadvertent 
partial 
disengagement of 
autopilot 
(unauthorized person 
in cockpit 
inadvertently 
disabled autopilot's 
control of the 
ailerons) 
Stall, Mode Confusion 
89 
3/8/1994 B737, VT-
SIA / Sahara 
India 
Airlines     
Delhi-Indira 
Ghandi 
International 
Airport,         
India 
4 (4)      
+ 4 on 
ground 
Takeoff         
(Training Flight)
Inappropriate 
Control Input by 
Crew (Trainee Pilot 
Applied Incorrect 
Rudder Input During 
Engine Failure 
Exercise) 
Loss of control resulting 
from inappropriate 
control input 
90 
1/7/1994 Jetstream 41, 
N304UE /   
United 
Express     
(Flt. 6291) 
1.9 km E of 
Columbus 
International 
Airport,         
Ohio,  USA 
5 (9) Approach Aircraft stall on final 
approach, possibly 
under icing 
conditions 
Stall 
91 
12/15/1993 IAI-1124, 
N309CK /   
Martin 
Aviation    
6.5 km N of Santa 
Ana, CA        
USA 
5 (5) Approach Loss of control 
resulting from 
atmospheric 
disturbance 
Atmospheric 
Disturbance, Wake 
92 
8/18/1993 DC-8, 
N814CK /   
Kalitta 
International 
(Flt. 808) 
Guantanamo,     
Cuba 
0 Approach Vehicle stalled on 
final approach 
coupled with flight 
crew fatigue 
Stall 
93 
4/29/1993 Embraer 120, 
N24706 /    
Continental 
Express     
(Flt. 2733) 
Pine Bluff, AR   
USA 
0 Climb Autopilot-induced 
stall, Crew Fatigue, 
Possible PIO 
Stall 
94 
4/7/1993 B757, C-
FOOA /     
Canada 3000 
Airline      
Charter (Elite 
Flt. 833) 
30 miles S of 
Houston, TX     
USA 
0 Cruise In-flight upset as a 
result of extreme 
turbulence and 
system failure 
(Aircraft generators 
came off-line with 
loss of power to all 
flight, navigation, 
and engine 
instruments) 
Atmospheric 
Disturbance, Turbulence
95 
4/6/1993 MD-11, B-
2171   /  
China 
Eastern 
Airlines     
(Flt. 583) 
1760 km S of 
Shemya, AK     
USA 
2 (255) Cruise In-flight upset as a 
result of inadvertent 
slat deployment 
during cruise, Large 
Load Factor 
Excursions Resulting 
in Structural Damage
Vehicle Upset, 
Inappropriate / 
Inadvertent Control Input
96 
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3/5/1993 Fokker 100, 
PH-KXL /   
Palair 
Macedonian  
(Flt. 301) 
Skopje Airport,   
Macedonia 
83 (97) Takeoff - Initial 
Climb 
Loss of roll 
controllability due to 
contaminated wing 
resulting from icing
Icing - Contaminated 
Airfoil 
97 
3/4/1993 Aerospatiale 
ATR-42, 
N99838 /    
Britt Airways 
(Flt 3444) 
Near Newark 
International 
Airport, NJ      
USA 
0 Approach Loss of roll control 
due to contaminated 
wing resulting from 
icing 
Icing - Contaminated 
Airfoil 
98 
12/7/1992 MD-11, B-
150   /  China 
Airlines     
(Flt. 012) 
Near Kushimoto, 
Japan 
0 Cruise Vehicle upset 
resulting from 
turbulence, 
Excessive control 
inputs by pilot, 
Damage sustained to 
left and right 
outboard elevator 
resulting in loss of 
portions of these 
surfaces 
Atmospheric 
Disturbance - Turbulence
99 
6/6/1992 B737-204 
HP-120 /    
COPA 
Airlines 
Tucuti,          
Panama 
47 (47)   Uncontrolled 
Descent resulting 
from instrumentation 
fault/failure 
(Incorrect Bank 
Indication) 
Uncontrolled Descent, 
Flight control component 
failure 
100 
3/22/1992 Fokker F-28, 
N485US /    
USAir      
(Flt. 405) 
New York       
La Guardia 
Airport, NY, 
USA 
27 (51) Takeoff - Initial 
Climb 
Vehicle stalled as a 
result of icing 
conditions 
Stall / Icing 
101 
2/15/1992 DC-8, 
N794AL /   
Air Transport 
Internation 
(ATI)       
(Flt. 805) 
5 km NW of 
Toledo-Express 
Airport, OH     
USA 
4 (4) Approach Vehicle upset 
resulting from 
possible crew 
disorientation or 
instrumentation 
failure (attitude 
director) 
Vehicle Upset -         
Unusual Attitudes 
102 
9/18/1991 Convair CV-
580, C-FICA 
/           
Canair Cargo 
Belvedere Center, 
VT, USA 
2 (2) Cruise Vehicle upset 
resulting from spatial 
disorientation,  
In-flight break-up 
resulting from 
exceedance of design 
stress limits of the 
aircraft 
Vehicle upset - spatial 
disorientation 
103 
9/11/1991 Embraer 120, 
N33701 /    
Jet Link - 
Continental 
Express     
(Flt. 2574) 
Eagle Lake, TX  
USA 
14 (14) Cruise Vehicle upset 
resulting from 
airframe damage  
(In-flight separation 
of the left horizontal 
stabilizer leading 
edge resulting from 
improper 
maintenance to 
replace the de-ice 
boots) 
Vehicle upset - airframe 
damage 
104 
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5/26/1991 B767, OE-
LAV /  
Lauda Air   
(Flt. 004) 
5.6 km NNE of 
Phu Toey,  
Thailand 
223 (223) Initial Climb Vehicle stall and 
damage to and partial 
separation of the 
rudder and left 
elevator resulting 
from in-flight 
deployment of thrust 
reverser; This was 
followed by the 
down-and-aft 
separation of most of 
the right horizontal 
stabilizer; a torsional 
overload then caused 
the separation of the 
vertical and left 
horizontal stabilizers, 
followed by 
complete break-up of 
the wing and 
fuselage. The 
complete breakup of 
the tail, wing, and 
fuselage occurred in 
a matter of seconds. 
Stall - Flight control 
system fault/failure or 
inadvertent / erroneous 
crew action 
105 
4/5/1991 Embraer 120, 
N270AS /    
Atlantic 
Southeast 
Airlines - 
Delta 
Connection  
(Flt. 2311) 
Brunswick, GA   
USA 
23 (23) Approach Vehicle upset 
resulting from 
propeller system 
failure (Malfunction 
of the left engine 
propeller control 
unit, which resulted 
in an uncommanded 
and uncorrectable 
movement of the 
blades of the left 
propeller below the 
flight idle position)
Flight Control 
System/Component 
Failure 
106 
3/3/1991 B737-291 
N999UA  / 
United 
Airlines     
(UA 585) 
Colorado Springs, 
CO            
USA 
25 (25) Approach Vehicle upset 
resulting from rudder 
system failure 
(rudder reversal) 
Flight Control System / 
Component Failure 
107 
2/11/1991 A310, D-
AOAC /     
Interflug 
Near Moskva    
Russia 
0 Approach Vehicle stall during 
go-around resulting 
from inappropriate 
crew inputs (Crew 
overrode autopilot 
during go-around) 
Stall - Inappropriate 
Crew Control Inputs 
108 
9/20/1990 B707-321B 
NN320MJ  / 
Maranza, AZ     
USA 
1 (3) Takeoff (with 
Limited 
Instruments) 
Vehicle upset during 
takeoff due to 
inappropriate rudder 
trim (Rudder 
Trimmed Nose 
Right), Improper 
Pre-Flight Planning 
& Preparation by 
Pilot 
Vehicle upset - 
inappropriate rudder trim
109 
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7/19/1989 DC-10-10 
N1819U /  
United 
Airlines     
(Flt 232) 
Sioux City, Iowa  
USA 
111 (296) Cruise Uncontained engine 
failure resulting in 
vehicle damage and 
loss of hydraulics to 
control surfaces, 
Pilot Used 
Differential Engines 
to Crash Land Near 
Sioux City Gateway 
Airport 
Flight control 
system/component 
failure 
110 
3/10/1989 Fokker F-18, 
C-FONF /   
Air Ontario  
(Flt. 1363) 
Dryden 
Municipal 
Airport, ON     
Canada 
24 (69) Takeoff - Initial 
Climb 
Aircraft was unable 
to gain altitude due 
to contaminated 
airfoil from icing 
Icing - Contaminated 
Airfoil 
111 
1/8/1989 B737, G-
OBME / 
British 
Midland 
Airways     
(Flt. 092) 
Kegworth,       
United Kingdom  
Near East 
Midlands 
47 (126) Approach Engine Failure 
Combined with 
Inappropriate Crew 
Response (Crew 
Shut Down Wrong 
Engine ) 
Engine Failure 
112 
9/15/1988 B737, ET-
AJA / 
Ethiopian 
Airlines     
(Flt. 604) 
10 km SW of 
Bahar Dar 
Airport,         
Ethiopia 
35 (104) Takeoff Loss of both engines 
due to ingestion of 
foreign objects 
(birds) 
Engine Damage 
113 
2/9/1988 Jetstream 31, 
N823JS / 
Jetstream 
International 
- Piedmont 
Commuter 
Springfield 
Airport, OH,  
USA 
3 (3) Approach - 
During Go-
Around 
Loss of control 
resulting from 
inappropriate vehicle 
configuration during 
go-around; 
Insufficient 
supervision during 
training flight 
Vehicle Impairment - 
Inappropriate Vehicle 
Configuration 
114 
8/31/1987 B737, HS-
TBC /       
Thai Airways 
(Flt. 365) 
15 km off Phuket, 
Thailand 
83 (83) Approach Vehicle stalled on 
final approach, Pilot 
distracted by traffic 
pattern on approach 
and did not execute a 
recovery in time to 
save the vehicle 
Stall 
115 
3/4/1987 CASA C-
212, N160FB 
/           
Northwest 
Airlink      
(Flt. 2268) 
Detroit 
Metropolitan 
Wayne County 
Airport, MI      
USA 
9 (19) Final Approach Vehicle upset 
resulting from 
inappropriate control 
inputs by Crew 
(Asymmetric power 
condition at low 
speed following 
pilot's intentional use 
of beta mode of 
propeller operation 
to descend and slow 
the airplane rapidly 
on final approach) 
Inappropriate Control 
Input by Crew 
116 
 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
 
 
37
9/6/1985 DC-9-14 
N100ME / 
Midwest 
Express     
(Flt 105) 
Milwaukee, WI   
USA 
31 (31) Takeoff Vehicle stall 
resulting from engine 
failure and 
inappropriate crew 
response (Pilot Input 
Incorrect Rudder 
Command) 
Engine, stall 
117 
8/12/1985 B747, 
JA8119 /    
Japan Air 
Lines       
(Flt. 123) 
Near Ueno       
Japan 
520 (524) Cruise Airframe damage 
that resulted in loss 
of control surfaces 
(Rupture of aft 
bulkhead initiated by 
fatigue cracks, 
resulting in 
separation of a 
portion of the 
vertical fin and the 
section of the 
tailcone that contains 
the auxiliary power 
unit; this damage 
caused a drop in 
hydraulic pressure, 
which resulted in the 
inoperability of the 
control surfaces) 
Airframe Failure 
118 
2/19/1985 B747, 
N4522V /    
China 
Airlines     
(Flt. 006) 
550 km NW off 
San Francisco, 
CA            
USA 
0         
(2 Serious 
Injuries) 
Cruise In-flight upset 
following engine 
failure resulting from 
insufficiency of the 
autopilot for 
operation under 
abnormal conditions; 
Crew was distracted 
with the engine 
failure, relied too 
heavily on the 
autopilot, and failed 
to monitor airplane's 
flight instruments; 
Successful recovery 
and safe landing 
were made by the 
crew; Airplane 
suffered major 
structural damage 
during the upset, 
descent, and 
subsequent recovery
Flight Control System 
Failure - Engines, 
Autopilot Insufficiency 
for Off-Nominal 
Operation 
119 
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1/21/1985 Lockheed L-
188 Electra, 
N5532 /     
Galaxy 
Airlines     
(Flt. 203) 
3 km SE of Reno 
/ Tahoe 
International 
Airport, NV     
USA 
70 (71) Takeoff - Initial 
Climb 
Aircraft stalled as a 
result of in-flight 
vehicle anomaly / 
damage (Failure of 
ground crew to 
secure the air start 
access door, which 
caused unexpected 
"thunking" noise and 
vibration during 
takeoff - and possible 
airframe damage) 
Stall 
120 
5/30/1984 Lockheed L-
188 Electra, 
N5523 /     
Zantop 
International 
Airlines     
(Flt. 931) 
Chalkhill, PA    
USA 
4 (4) Cruise Vehicle upset 
resulting from 
instrumentation 
failure (No. 2 Gyro 
Malfunction; 
Possible conflicting 
pitch and roll 
information to flight 
crew), In-flight 
damage and breakup 
resulting from 
overstress during 
upset and attempted 
recovery 
System & Component 
Failure - Instrumentation
121 
7/9/1982 B727, N4737 
/              Pan 
American 
World 
Airways     
(Flt. 759) 
New Orleans, LA 
USA 
145 (145)  
+ 8 on 
ground 
Takeoff - Initial 
Climb 
Microburst wind 
shear encounter on 
takeoff 
Atmospheric 
Disturbance - Wind 
Shear 
122 
1/13/1982 B737, 
N62AF /     
Air Florida   
(Flt. 90) 
1.4 km N of 
Washington-
National Airport, 
DC,   USA 
74 (79)    
+ 4 on 
ground 
Takeoff - Initial 
Climb 
Vehicle stalled as a 
result of icing 
conditions that 
contaminated the 
airfoil 
Stall / Icing 
123 
11/11/1979 DC-10, XA-
DUH  /     
AeroNaves   
(Flt. 945)  
Near Luxemburg, 
Germany 
0 Takeoff - Climb to 
Cruise 
Autopilot-Induced 
stall in vertical speed 
mode; Overload 
failure to elevator 
assembly 
attachments (in-flight 
separation) 
Stall 
124 
 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
 
 
39
5/25/1979 DC-10-10, 
N110AA /  
American 
Airlines (Flt. 
191) 
O’Hare 
International 
Airport         
Chicago, IL      
USA 
271 (271)  
+2 
Takeoff  (Just 
After Rotation) 
Vehicle stalled as a 
result of vehicle 
damage (separation 
of Left Engine & 
Pylon Assembly & 
~3 ft. of Leading 
Edge from Left Wing 
with Uncommanded 
Retraction of Left 
Wing Outboard LE 
Slats (Resulted from 
Poor Maintenance)); 
Failure of Stall 
Warning System 
Airframe Damage / Stall
125 
4/4/1979 B727, 
N840TW /   
Trans World 
Airlines     
(Flt. 841) 
Near Saginaw, 
MI          USA 
0 Cruise Vehicle Upset 
resulting from 
control surface 
failure - Slat 
Asymmetry: 
Aircraft's No. 7 
leading edge slat (on 
its right wing) was 
stuck in the extended 
or partially extended 
position and could 
not be retracted (due 
to a pre-existing 
misalignment and the 
resulting air loads); 
No. 7 slat was torn 
from the aircraft 
System / Component 
Failure - Flight Control 
System 
126 
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